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BORN TO TAKE RISK? THE EFFECT OF CEO BIRTH ORDER
ON STRATEGIC RISK TAKING
ROBERT J. CAMPBELL
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
SEUNG-HWAN JEONG
Georgia State University
SCOTT D. GRAFFIN
University of Georgia
The importance of birth order has been the subject of debate for centuries, and has cap-
tured the attention of the general public and researchers alike. Despite this interest,
scholars have little understanding of the impact birth order has on CEOs and their stra-
tegic decisions. With this in mind, we develop theory that explains how CEO birth order
may be associated with strategic risk taking. Drawing from evolutionary theory argu-
ments related to birth order, we theorize that CEO birth order is positively associated with
strategic risk taking; that is, earlier-born CEOswill take less risk than later-born CEOs. As
evolutionary theory proposes that birth order effects are driven by sibling rivalry, we also
argue that this relationship is moderated by three factors related to sibling rivalry: age gap
between a CEO and the closest born sibling, CEO age, and the presence of a sibling CEO.
Our results provide support for our theorizing and suggest that birth order may have
important implications for organizations. We believe this study helps advance strategic
management research, the broader multidisciplinary “family science” literature, and the
much-needed cross-pollination of ideas between the two.
“Birth order is a human experience that is one of the
most pervasive and universally thought to determine
who we are.” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 96)
The importance of an individual’s birth order, or
the “relative rank of a child in terms of the age hier-
archy among siblings in the family,” has been of
great interest to the public and researchers alike
(Steelman, 1985: 354–355). Birth order, which cap-
tures early-life experiences within the family do-
main, has been described as one of, if not the most,
fundamental, engrained, and generalizable deter-
minants of individual behavior (Jaskiewicz, Combs,
Shanine, & Kacmar, 2017; Sulloway, 1996). Best-
selling parenting books and popular press articles
have detailed the influence birth order has on chil-
dren’s development and adult behavior (Isaacson &
Radish, 2002; Radovanovic & Lebowitz, 2016). Re-
search across disciplines, including education and
thehealth sciences, has also highlightedbirth order’s
influence on diverse behaviors, such as school at-
tendance (e.g., Emerson & Souza, 2008) and smoking
(e.g., Juon, Shin, & Nam, 1995).
While birth order captures important early-life
family-domain experiences, within upper eche-
lons research, as well as the broader management
literature, “this truth has not had much impact”
(Jaskiewicz et al., 2017: 309). Theory surrounding
the influence of executive experiences on strategic
decisions has largely assumed that work-related ex-
periences are of primary importance (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Considering that the
family has been described as the “most important
and enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith,
2009: 5), there is reason to believe that this limited
focus may be problematic. This is especially true
given that evolutionary theory logic suggests that
early-life family experiences, which birth order
captures, shape an individual’s tendency to engage
in behaviors in childhood that persist throughout life
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and, aswe theorize, into the executive suite (Suitor &
Pillemer, 2007; Sulloway, 1996).
We thus attempt to shift the CEO experiences lit-
erature to the family domain by developing theory
to explain how CEO birth order influences CEOs’
strategic decisions, specifically strategic risk taking.
Evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1968) suggests that
humans adapt to their environment over time to
survive. One birth order–related adaptation is sib-
ling rivalry (Buss, 2007; Sulloway, 1996). Humans
developed the tendency to engage in sibling rivalry
since historically many children did not survive
to adulthood (Buss, 2007). By engaging in sibling
rivalry siblings compete for parental investment,
which may lead to resource allocation differences
that historically increased the likelihood of survival
(Buss, 2007; Sulloway, 1996).
When engaging in sibling rivalry, siblings use
different behaviors to increase their parents’ in-
vestment in their welfare; birth order drives these
behavior choices. Specifically, siblings use differ-
ent behaviors so that they fulfill “niches” within
the family to garner additional parental resources
(Plomin & Daniels, 1987; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke,
2009). Evolutionary theory suggests that birth order
is a powerful determinant of the behaviors siblings
use in this rivalry (Steelman, 1985; Sulloway, 1996).
Indeed, birth order “causes siblings to experience
family relationships in dissimilar ways and to pur-
sue different ways of maximizing their parent’s
investment” (Sulloway, 2001: 40). As a result of
birth order, different behavioral tendencies become
engrained (Sulloway, 1999, 2001) and “persist into
adulthood” (Suitor & Pillemer, 2007; Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
Building on this logic, we theorize that birth order
is positively associated with an individual’s pen-
chant for risk taking. Evolutionary theory logic
suggests that an individual’s birth order directly re-
lates to the tendency to engage in risky behaviors
(Sulloway&Zweigenhaft, 2010). Parents investmore
in earlier-born children and these individuals have a
greater tendency to “not take unnecessary chances
[or risks]” (Grable & Joo, 2004: 81). In contrast, later-
born children tend to receive less parental in-
vestment and resources (Hertwig, Davis, &Sulloway,
2002). Evolutionary theory thus suggests that youn-
ger siblings are more likely to engage in risky be-
haviors to try to “recalibrate parental investment in
their favor” (Sulloway &Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414). As
scholars suggest that one’s birth order influences
their risk-taking propensity, we theorize that this
tendency to engage in risky behaviors carries over
into the executive suite, such that the later a CEO’s
birth order, the more strategic risk they will take.
We also examine the boundaries of CEO birth or-
der by developing theory regarding moderators. As
moderators can provide evidence for a theorized
mechanism (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Shi, Zhang, &
Hoskisson, 2017)—in our case, sibling rivalry—we
theorize about moderators that scholars have sug-
gested tap into sibling rivalry (e.g., McNerney &
Usner, 2001; Stocker, Lanthier, & Furman, 1997).
Specifically, we theorize that the extent to which
sibling rivalrywaspresent in childhood, as indicated
by the age gap between a CEO and the closest sibling,
will impact the extent to which birth order effects
were engrained—amplifying the main effect. We
suggest that the extent to which childhood sibling
rivalry is recalled, which we assess using CEO age,
will impact the main effect. Finally, we theorize that
the extent to which sibling rivalry is ongoing, as in-
dicated by having a sibling CEO, will amplify the
main effect.
We test our theory in the context of family-
controlled business groups in South Korea, which
are collections of legally independent firms operat-
ing across multiple industries bonded together by
formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). This organizational form
comprises a significant portion of family firms,
which is the most common type of business in the
world (La Porta, Lo´pez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999;
Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Indeed, business groups
are a prevalent organizational form across much of
Asia, EuropeLatinAmerica, and theMiddle East (see
Table 1), allowingour findings to generalize to a large
portionofglobalbusinesses (Colpan,Hikino,&Lincoln,
2010). To enhance generalizability, we also include
quotes from two U.S. sibling CEOs we interviewed
and, in a supplemental analysis, find support for
our theory in a small sample of U.S. public firm
CEOs.
Our study makes four main contributions. First,
we shift the theoretical conversation around execu-
tive experiences toward the family domain and an
important construct that captures early-life family
domain experiences—birth order. In focusing on
birth order, we also introduce a characteristic that
captures early-life experiences that may shape ex-
ecutives’ strategic decisions. In fact, to better un-
derstand birth order’s generalizability, we searched
for and found studies demonstrating birth order
differences in the 15 largest world economies (see
Table 2). Thus, unlike some CEO characteristics that
may occur and be interpreted differently across
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cultures (Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003;
Hofstede & McCrae, 2004),1 birth order seems to
generalize and generate similar effects worldwide.
Second, drawing on evolutionary theory, we re-
spond to calls to leverage “family science” theories
in management, given the enduring importance of
family. Our theory and findings have broad impli-
cations, as a CEO’s birth order should impact risk
taking across organizational forms. Indeed, our pri-
mary and supplementary analyses provide evidence
that birth order impacts the strategic risk taking
of CEOs in business groups and public firms. Our
moderated finding regarding sibling CEOs, however,
is of particular importance for family firms and
business groups, where siblings aremore often CEOs
of separate public firms (Carney, 2008).
Third, we develop theory around birth order mod-
erators.While scholars have suggested that birth order
effects are contingent, birth order research has been
criticized for its “failure to assess the role of relevant
moderator variables” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010:
413). We address this by theorizing and finding that
birth order effects are amplified when sibling ri-
valry during childhood may have been intense and
when ongoing sibling rivalry is present, which we
suggest age gap with siblings and presence of a
sibling CEO captures, respectively. Finally, we ad-
vance understanding of strategic risk taking, which
is a core strategic decision and the focus of much
corporate governance research (e.g., Eisenhardt,
1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Upper Echelons Theory
ResearchonCEOexperienceshasprimarilydrawn
on upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason,
1984). Utilizing the concept of bounded rationality
(Cyert &March, 1963), “the idea that informationally
complex, uncertain situations are not objectively
knowable, but rather are merely interpretable”
(Hambrick, 2007: 334), this theory suggests that ex-
ecutives filter and interpret situations facing their
firms based on their characteristics (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). As such, upper echelons theory as-
sumes that executive characteristics are related to
strategic decisions.
Building on this theory, CEO characteristics
research has largely developed along two lines
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). First, scholars have exam-
ined the relation between psychological properties
and strategic decisions. These studies have focused
on executive personality captured through the Big
Five dimensions (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014;
Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010), as well as other per-
sonality constructs, such as narcissism, hubris, and
overconfidence (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015). More recent work in
this area has focused on CEOs’ values, such as po-
litical ideology (e.g., Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie,
& Graffin, 2015), and cognitive aspects, such as
temporal disposition (e.g., Chen & Nadkarni, 2017).
The second line of research, and our focus, theo-
rizes about the influence of experiences on strategic
TABLE 1
Family Business Group Representation Around the
World
Country
Family
Group %
Family Group
Market Cap %
Country
GDP Rank
Argentina 19.48 11.03 21
Belgium 24.39 28.50 24
Brazil 20.91 15.31 8
Canada 5.16 13.15 10
Chile 46.19 44.52 41
Colombia 48.21 52.13 39
Demark 9.73 20.06 35
France 11.19 9.20 7
Greece 20.00 19.06 51
Hong Kong 15.63 26.29 33
India 29.31 22.63 6
Indonesia 29.70 53.07 16
Israel 40.09 23.22 31
Italy 19.24 26.34 9
Malaysia 17.03 38.51 37
Mexico 26.24 49.47 15
Pakistan 22.87 9.89 40
Peru 21.53 43.09 49
Philippines 45.95 30.23 38
Portugal 23.08 9.94 46
Singapore 10.69 41.11 36
Sri Lanka 66.67 43.88 64
Sweden 20.41 25.66 22
Thailand 21.72 47.06 25
Turkey 50.00 46.43 17
Notes: These data were sourced fromMasulis, Pham, and Zein
(2011). Familygroup%refers to thepercentageof all listed firms in
a country that belong to a business group.Family groupmarket cap
% refers to the proportion of aggregate market capitalization at-
tributable to business groups. Country GDP rank data were taken
fromWorldBank (2017b).
1 For instance, a culture’s individualism influences the
likelihood, aswell as the interpretation, of narcissism (e.g.,
Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003). Further, Hofstede
and McCrae (2004) found that the prevalence of various
personality traits is endogenous to certain cultural
dimensions.
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decisions. These studies have generally focused
on work-related experiences captured by job
tenure; exposure to different functional areas,
industries, or countries; and formal education
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Executive tenure has
largely been related to cognitive inertia (e.g.,
Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014), whereas func-
tional background research has centered on
the idea that it provides a lens through which
executives interpret business problems (e.g.,
Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014).
Similarly, research on managers’ international
experience (e.g., Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000) and
on formal education has focused on how such
experiences impact executives’ information fil-
tering and ultimately their decisions.
While research on executive experiences has
enhanced our understanding of CEOs’ strategic
decisions, family science research, in particular
evolutionary theory logic on birth order, has sug-
gested that the limited focus on CEOs’work-related
experiences may be problematic. Indeed, the fam-
ily has been described as the “most important and
enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith,
2009: 5); thus, these experiences may have impor-
tant implications—even for CEOs. In particular, we
suggest that family domain experiences may in-
fluence how CEOs perceive and react to their
environment.
Birth order captures fundamental early-life family
experiences that come with growing up under the
care of parents along with siblings (Jaskiewicz et al.,
2017; Sulloway, 1996). In addition, scholars have
suggested that birthordermight impactCEOs’ strategic
decisions (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). We thus advance
theory on executive experiences by developing new
theory surrounding the family andbirth order—a topic
to which we now turn.
Birth Order and Evolutionary Theory
Birth order research has a storied history. Most
trace its roots to Sir Francis Galton, who noticed that
first-borns were overrepresented among renowned
English scientists (Galton, 1874). This insight caught
the attention of two prominent psychologists,
Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, who developed
competing birth order perspectives. Freud’s birth
order research centered on psychoanalysis and sex-
ual desires (Daly&Wilson, 1990),whileAdler linked
birth order with neuroses, with first-born and last-
born children being more likely to develop neuroses
(Adler, 1928). As a first-born child, Freud took of-
fense to Adler’s theory, and so, birth order became a
cause of “oneof themost heated scientific disputes of
all time” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 96).
Birth order research remains a popular topic;
scholarly explanations, however, have shifted to an
TABLE 2
Studies Examining Birth Order’s Global Influence
Author(s) and Year Country
Country
Rank (GDP) Findings
Gilliam and Chatterjee (2011) United States 1 Later-borns more willing to make risky investments
Xu and Zheng (2014) China 2 Later-borns more likely to have homosexual orientation
Kusunoki et al. (2012) Japan 3 Later-borns have less risk of food allergies
Ha¨rko¨nen (2013) Germany 4 Birth order has a negative effect on educational attainment
Green and Griffiths (2014) United Kingdom 5 Later-borns have greater risk of post traumatic stress disorder
Adli, Louichi, and Tamouh (2010) France 6 Positive relationship between birth order and educational
achievement
Jayachandran and Pande (2017) India 7 Positive relationship between birth order and height
disadvantage
Bacci, Bartolucci, Chiavarini,
Minelli, and Pieroni (2014)
Italy 8 Positive relationship between birth order and birth weight
Emerson and Souza (2008) Brazil 9 Positive relationship between birth order and school attendance
Davis (1997) Canada 10 Negative relationship between birth order and status orientation
Juon et al. (1995) South Korea 11 Later-borns more likely to smoke than earlier-born boys
Rohde et al. (2003)a Russia 12 Last-born child more likely to be the parents’ favorite
Milne and Judge (2009) Australia 13 Later-borns have first sexual experience at younger age
Bertoni and Brunello (2016)a Spain 14 Later-borns switch jobs earlier and more frequently
Lafortune and Lee (2014)a Mexico 15 Birth order negatively related to years of education
a Study contained samples from multiple countries. Country rank based on WorldBank (2017b).
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evolutionary theory perspective, which is based on
the concept of evolution—change over time in living
structures among species (Buss, 2007). Darwin
(1968) is credited with introducing evolutionary
theory, but other scholars set the stage for his re-
search. Lamarck (1809) noted that species change,
suggesting that giraffes developed long necks to
reach high leaves. Further, early evolutionists sug-
gested that many animals had adaptations; for ex-
ample, turtles have protective shells and porcupines
have quills to fend off predators (Buss, 2007).
Missing from early research, however, was an ex-
planation of how these adaptations develop. Draw-
ing on Malthus (1798) regarding the principles of
population, Darwin (1968) provided an answer.
Darwin (1968: 13) recognized that, “More [organ-
isms] are produced than can possibly survive,” and
so, “there, must [. . .] be a struggle for existence;” he
thus introduced the concept of natural selection, a
process whereby organisms adapt and change over
time to increase their ability to survive in the envi-
ronment. Building on Darwin (1968), scholars have
investigated a number of adaptations, or “inherited
or reliably developing characteristic[s] that came
into existence through natural selection” to help
with an adaptive problem for an organism’s ances-
tors (Buss, 2007: 39; see also Tooby & Cosmides,
1992).
An adaptation related to birth order is sibling ri-
valry, which is driven by conflict between siblings
over parental investment (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers,
1974). Indeed, as Buckley (2005: 295) noted, “family
life is filled with frequently gory and often fatal
struggles between offspring.” Added parental in-
vestment results in resource allocation differences
that may increase a child’s likelihood of survival
(Sulloway, 1996). Thus, because “children cannot
survive without parental help” (Buss, 2007: 68),
sibling rivalry deals with the survival problem.
Research has noted the prevalence of sibling ri-
valry across species. In some species, siblings in-
crease their suckling to drain their mother’s milk to
the detriment of their siblings, and some bird species
siblings jockey for food (Buss, 2007; Royle, Hartley,
Owens, & Parker, 1999). The most extreme form of
rivalry is infanticide, whereby an organism kills its
kin. Indeed, “infanticide, long considered a rare and
aberrant phenomenon, has turned out to be wide-
spread among insects, fish, birds, and mammals”
(Sulloway, 1996: 61). Sand sharks, for example, often
devour one another while in the mother’s womb
until only one shark is left alive (Sulloway, 1996).
Further, among some bird species it is common for
siblings to try and exclude siblings from the nest, or
evenpoke each other to death (Buss, 2007; Sulloway,
1996).
Human sibling rivalry, while typically less
extreme, is still consequential. Historically, many
children did not survive to adulthood. As Buss
(2007: 62) noted, “Our ancestors. . .did not have it so
easy. Many obstacles lay betweenwaking up hungry
and dozing off at night with a full belly.” Humans
thus engage in sibling rivalry to compete for parental
investment because differences in parental in-
vestment and resources, such as food, historically
increased a child’s likelihood of survival (Sulloway,
1996).
Birth Order and Sibling Rivalry
The primary driver of sibling rivalry is birth order
(Sulloway, 1996). Birth order is thought to be a
powerful determinant of behaviors siblings use in
this rivalry (Steelman, 1985: 354–355). Due to dif-
ferences driven by birth order, research has sug-
gested that siblings develop tendencies to use
specific behaviors to fill niches within the family,
which may help them gain parental attention and
resources (Sulloway, 1996). Indeed, birth order
“causes siblings to experience family relationships
in dissimilar ways and to pursue different ways of
maximizing their parent’s investment” (Sulloway,
2001: 40). Evolutionary theory research has thus
concluded that birth order fundamentally shapes
how individuals tend to behave, and is thus “one of
the ultimate causes of [. . .] development” (Sulloway,
2001: 40) regardless of an individual’s gender (e.g.,
Argys, Rees, Averett, &Witoonchart, 2006; Badger &
Reddy, 2009).
This tendency to utilize certain behaviors associ-
ated with birth order “foster[s] individual differ-
ences in terms of how individuals can be expected to
behave” (Wang et al., 2009: 79). Different tendencies
to use specific behaviors are thus “developed in
childhood, as part of niche differentiation, including
differences arising from disparities in parental in-
vestment” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 413).
Research has also suggested that these behavioral
differences “persist into adulthood” (Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414), including for samples with
individuals in their 60s and even their 90s (Jefferson,
Herbst, & McCrae, 1998; Suitor & Pillemer, 2007).
Further, “the underlying psychological mecha-
nisms [. . .] are not culture specific” (Denny, 2004:
13), and these effects seem to generalize across
countries and cultures. Scholars have found support
1282 AugustAcademy of Management Journal
for birth order differences in a diverse set of coun-
tries, such as Australia (Davis, 1997), Brazil (Milne &
Judge, 2009), China (Xu & Zheng, 2014), India
(Emerson & Souza, 2008), and South Korea (Juon
et al., 1995). Consistent with this idea, we found re-
search showing birth order effects in each of the top
15 global economies (see Table 2).
Building on this logic surrounding birth order,
scholarly research traditionally focused on devel-
oping theory and empirically testing its associa-
tion with the Big Five personality traits, and
subsequent behaviors these traits influence
(Sulloway, 1995). A growing body of research,
however, has also suggested that birth order in-
fluences an individual’s risk-taking propensity, an
important and stable aspect of personality outside
of the Big Five2 (Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, &
Hertwig, 2017; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton‐O’Creevy,
& Willman, 2005) that indicates an individual’s
tendency to engage in risk across contexts. For ex-
ample, birth order has been shown to be positively
associated with risky behaviors, such as risky ado-
lescent behaviors (Argys et al., 2006), participation
in risky sports (Nisbett, 1968), and risky financial
decisions (Gilliam&Chatterjee, 2011).Meta-analytic
evidence, albeit in the sports context, has suggested
that birth order’s relationship with risk-taking pro-
pensity may even be stronger than its relationship
with other personality aspects, such as the Big Five
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010)
CEO BIRTH ORDER AND STRATEGIC
RISK TAKING
Risk taking is a core CEOdecision; thus, the notion
that birth order may be related to risk taking is con-
sequential for scholars and practitioners. Indeed,
above and beyond being a core decision, numerous
corporate governance mechanisms, such as execu-
tive compensation and board of directors composi-
tion, are intended to influence CEOs’ strategic risk
taking (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). We thus develop theory about CEO
birth order and its relationship with strategic risk
taking.
We theorize that CEO birth order relates to strate-
gic risk taking because birth order influences the
extent to which individuals may engage in risky be-
haviors to deal with sibling rivalry and foster their
niche within the family to gain parental attention
and resources. This tendency to engage in risky be-
haviors in childhood should become engrained and,
as previous studies have found, become a key driver
of an individual’s risk propensity, which “persist[s]
into adulthood,” influencing subsequent behaviors
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
In considering what behaviors siblings use to deal
with sibling rivalry and gain parental favor, we the-
orize that the earlier a sibling is in the birth order, the
less they will attempt to garner parental investment
and thus the lower their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors to carve out a niche. Scholars have noted
that earlier-born children tend to be endowed with
greater parental resources (Hertwig et al., 2002). This
is partly because older siblings “tend to be larger,
stronger, and more intellectually developed” than
their younger siblings (Freese, Powell, & Steelman,
1999: 211). As a result, earlier-born children tend to
get their own way, which grants them easier access
to resources (Beck, Burnet, & Vosper, 2006; Hotz &
Pantano, 2015). Because earlier-born children are
endowed with greater resources, there is less need
for them to try to gain favor by engaging in risky be-
haviors. They are thus expected to have a lower risk-
taking propensity. As Grable and Joo (2004: 81)
noted, parents invest more in earlier-born children
so they tend to actmore responsibly and do “not take
unnecessary chances [or risks].”
Later-born siblings, in contrast, tend to receive less
parental investment and resources (Hertwig et al.,
2002), and thus, we theorize, will take greater risks
to establish a niche to gain attention and material
support. Scholars have noted that, “In a Darwinian
world,” risk taking is “adaptive wherever the chan-
ces of survival or reproduction are limited”
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414). This makes
sense, given that the costs of risk taking are reduced
when life expectancy is lower (Daly &Wilson, 1990;
Wang et al., 2009). Relative to older siblings, younger
siblings historically faced lower life expectancies.
Puffer and Serrano (1973), for example, found that
fifth-borns have “2 to 3 times the mortality rates of
firstborns in many Latin American countries” (as
cited in Sulloway&Zweigenhaft, 2010: 403). Similar
mortality rates have been found in other developed
countries (Hertwig et al., 2002).
Evolutionary theory perspective on birth order
thus suggests that the later a sibling is in the birth
order, the greater their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors to try to convince parents to “recalibrate
2 While research has indicated that risk propensity is a
personality trait outside the Big Five, research has also
indicated that sublevel aspects of the Big Five, such as
sensation seeking, are facets of risk propensity (e.g.,
Nicholson et al., 2005).
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parental investment in their favor or, failing that, as a
way of compensating for reduced parental in-
vestment” (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010: 414).
Specifically, Bertoni and Brunello (2016: 265) sug-
gested that “later-borns are put under greater pres-
sure to obtain the same returns from more limited
resources and thus need to take riskier moves.”
Research across varying contexts and samples has
illustrated the positive relationship between birth
order and risk taking. Indeed, researchhas noted that
a striking finding from birth order research is that
siblings differ in “risk preferences as much as
strangers” (Wang et al., 2009: 79). Argys et al. (2006),
for example, found that birth order is positively as-
sociated with risky adolescent behaviors—stealing,
carrying a gun, and using marijuana. Similarly, Juon
et al. (1995) found that later-born South Korean high
school students are more likely to smoke, while
Jobe, Holgate, and Scrapansky (1983), in a sample of
U.S. military males, found that later-borns are more
likely to volunteer for a risky experiment.
Researchers have also explored how birth order
influences risky sports outcomes. A number of
studies (e.g., Nisbett, 1968) have found that birth
order is positively related toplaying risky sports (e.g.,
football and rugby). Meta-analytically, Sulloway and
Zweigenhaft (2010) found that younger-born siblings
are 1.5 times more likely to participate in risky sports.
Scholars have also found that birth order is related to
risky behaviors when playing a sport. Alberts and
Landers (1977), for example, found that later-borns are
more likely to take the risk to jump from a height of 1.8
meters. In a sample of Major League Baseball (MLB)
players, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) found that
younger siblings are 10.6 times more likely than older
siblings to attempt the high-risk activity of base-
stealing.
Scholars have also examined the relationship be-
tween birth order and risk taking in the business
context. Gilliam and Chatterjee (2011), for example,
surveyed students and found that later-borns were
more willing to make risky investments. Morgan
(2009) examined financial investments decisions,
and found that later-borns tend to take greater fi-
nancial risks and are more willing to gamble for a
higher payoff. Further, Bertoni and Brunello (2016)
found that later-borns switch jobs earlier and more
frequently due to their tendency to engage in risky
behaviors.
If individuals engage in behaviors suggested by
their birth order, and sibling differences in risk-
taking propensity do persist into adulthood (Sulloway
& Zweigenhaft, 2010), then a CEO’s birth order should
be associated with the strategic risk CEOs take in the
executive suite. Indeed, CEOs often make strategic
decisions that involve risk—i.e., decisions that are
highly uncertain and have a potential for negative
returns—thus, CEObirth order should play a role such
that the later aCEO’s birthorder, themore strategic risk
they should take. In support of this notion, we inter-
viewed twoU.S. sibling CEOswho each led firmswith
over $1 billion in annual sales, and the later-born sib-
ling noted that he is “more of a risk taker.” We thus
theorize:
Hypothesis 1. CEO birth order is positively associated
with strategic risk taking; that is, later-born CEOs will
take more risk than earlier-born CEOs.
MODERATING EFFECTS OF SIBLING RIVALRY
While we theorize a direct effect of CEO birth
order on strategic risk taking, scholars have sug-
gested that birth order may be influenced by mod-
erators (e.g., Sulloway, 1999). However, birth order
research has been criticized for its “failure to assess
the role of relevantmoderator variables” (Sulloway&
Zweigenhaft, 2010: 413). We thus develop new the-
ory about moderators of CEO birth order and strate-
gic risk taking. As evolutionary theory proposes that
birth order effects are driven by sibling rivalry
(Sulloway, 1996), we theorize that the extent to
which sibling rivalry was present during childhood,
the extent to which childhood sibling rivalry is
recalled, and the extent to which sibling rivalry is
ongoingwillmoderate the relationship betweenCEO
birth order and strategic risk taking. Developing
theory aboutmoderators that capture facets of sibling
rivalry allows us to provide further evidence for the
theorized mechanism suggested in our first hypoth-
esis, and also provides better understanding of the
boundary conditions of CEO birth order (Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Shi et al., 2017).3
Sibling Rivalry During Childhood
As birth order effects develop during childhood
(Sulloway, 1996), it follows that the extent to which
sibling rivalrywas present during this period should
3 BaronandKenny (1986: 1178) noted that there is “wide
variation in the strategic functions served by moderators.”
They state, “a moderator has been useful in suggesting a
mediator variable.” Thus, our moderators that attempt to
tap sibling rivalry help provide evidence that this mecha-
nism is driving our results.
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influence the degree to which the behavioral ten-
dencies become engrained and influence an in-
dividual’s risk-taking propensity (Kidwell, 1981).
That is, sibling rivalry is the key mechanism behind
birth order effects—these effects exist because sib-
lings, invying for a favorablenichewithin the family,
compete differently based on the order inwhich they
are born. If there is greater jockeying for parental
attention and resources during childhood, niche-
differentiationbehaviors based onbirth order should
bemore engrained.Accordingly,we theorize that the
effect of CEO birth order on strategic risk taking will
be amplified under conditions of greater childhood
sibling rivalry. On the other hand, if an individual’s
childhood featured little sibling rivalry, birth
order–based niche differentiation among siblings
should have been less salient, and, we theorize, the
relationship between CEO birth order and strategic
risk taking should thus be weakened.
We theorize that closest sibling age gap, or the
number of years in agebetweenan individual andhis
or her closest sibling (Freese et al., 1999), captures
the extent of childhood sibling rivalry. Research has
suggested that age gap influences the extent towhich
siblings need to compete with one another during
childhood and thus use behaviors to fulfill niches in
pursuit of parental attention (Sulloway, 2001).When
the age gap between siblings is small, siblings are
more likely to have to compete for scarce resources
and parental attention (Stocker et al., 1997). Indeed,
Badger and Reddy (2009: 47) stated that “the closer
in age two [. . .] siblings are, the more likely it is that
there will be competition between them,” and
Stocker et al. (1997) specifically found that age gap is
negatively correlated with conflict between siblings.
This is logical, as small sibling age gaps were tradi-
tionally associated with higher infant mortality
(Sulloway, 1996). The greater competition between
siblings closer in age thus likely promotes mutual
“differentiation as away of avoiding direct conflicts”
(Healey&Ellis, 2007: 56)—a condition that amplifies
birth order–based differences among siblings.
Siblings further apart in age should have less of a
need to compete for parental resources, however, as
“constraints on the time that parents can spend with
their children will [. . .] be less severe if the births of
children are spread out over a longer time period”
(De Haan, 2010: 583), and thus it should be easier for
parents to meet children’s needs if they are widely
spaced (Lasko, 1954). Further, “Greater birth spacing
between siblings helps to reduce sibling rivalry:
there is less resource competition, and it is more
likely that the elder sibling will support the younger
sibling” (Badger & Reddy, 2009: 47). Research on
birth order has thus suggested that as the age gap
between siblings becomes larger, siblings feel less
of a need to compete for the attention of parents,
which mutes the influence of birth order (Sulloway,
1999).
In sum, smaller age gaps with siblings intensifies
sibling rivalry during childhood, as well as the sa-
lience of niche differentiation behaviors among sib-
lings. As there is more competition among siblings
with small age gaps, later-borns in particular should
be more likely to develop the tendency to engage in
risky behaviors to create their own niche and com-
pete for parental attention when they also have a
small age gap with their siblings. This suggests that
the effect of CEO birth order on strategic risk taking
will be stronger when the gap between siblings is
smaller, and weaker when the gap is larger. We thus
theorize:
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
the age gap between a CEO and the closest-born sib-
ling, such that the relationship is strengthened when
the age gap is smaller andweakenedwhen the age gap
is larger.
Recall of Sibling Rivalry
The extent to which childhood sibling rivalry is
recalled, we theorize, also influences the relation-
ship between CEO birth order and strategic risk tak-
ing. Indeed, the birth order literature has suggested
that individuals are most likely to adhere to the be-
haviors associated with their birth order when they
recall “patterns of behavior learned within the fam-
ily,” namely the sibling rivalry experienced during
childhood (Sulloway, 2007: 176).
A factor that may predict the extent to which sib-
ling rivalry is recalled is age. Research has suggested
that age directly influences CEOs’ strategic risking.
In fact, scholars have suggested that due to emo-
tional aspects, such as the desire to protect their
wealth, CEO risk taking diminishes with age (e.g.,
Prendergast & Stole, 1996;Wiseman&Gomez-Mejia,
1998). Scholars have found conflicting results
with respect to this relationship (e.g., Buchholtz &
Ribbens, 1994; Serfling, 2014). Researchers have
found a positive relationship between age and CEO
risk taking (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Li & Tang, 2010)
and no effect of age on risk taking (e.g., Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011; Kish-Gephart & Campbell, 2015).
Results of a meta-analysis, however, suggested that
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CEO age generally has a negative effect on risk taking
(Wang, Holmes, Oh, & Zhu, 2016).
While we recognize that research has suggested
there may be a direct effect of CEO age on strategic
risk taking, we theorize instead that CEO age mod-
erates the direct effect of birth order on risk taking.
Though many birth order studies have focused on
younger samples, scholars have argued that because
birth order effects become engrained, these effects
persist throughout their lives. Consistent with this
idea, research has suggested that even among
mothers over 65 years old, birth order differences
persisted in terms of which child they would trust in
a crisis and the child with whom they felt the closest
emotional attachment (Suitor & Pillemer, 2007).
Similarly, in a sample of individuals aged 59–94,
much like in younger populations, later-borns
scored higher on openness to experience and agree-
ableness (Jefferson et al., 1998).
While scholars have suggested that birth order
differences endure throughout life, research has also
suggested that these effects weaken over time. That
is, age impacts the recall of sibling rivalry as well as
the emotional intensity associated with the recall,
and thus attenuates the relationship between birth
order and risk taking. The competition for parental
investment is “at its peak during childhood and ad-
olescence” (Damian & Roberts, 2015: 97) because
children aredependent on their parents for resources
and thus are most likely to engage in sibling rivalry
and use risky behaviors to differentiate themselves
from siblings and carve out their niche (Sulloway &
Zweigenhaft, 2010). In support of this notion,
McNerney and Usner (2001) found that sibling ri-
valry peaked between the ages of 10–15 and reduced
as people aged, and Scharf, Shulman, and Avigad-
Spitz (2005) noted that conflict and rivalry were also
reportedbyemerging adults to be less intense thanby
adolescents.
Further, individuals tend to be more independent
and less reliant on parental resources as they age
(Harris, 2000), and theymay be less inclined to recall
the sibling rivalry and utilize the risky behaviors
suggested by their birth order. Indeed, because be-
haviors that were “once relevant for survival in the
family context in early years may no longer be rele-
vant once the child leaves the family environment”
(Damian&Roberts, 2015: 97), there is likely to be less
emotional intensity associated with the recall of
childhood sibling rivalry. Scholars have suggested
that as people age they have a greater tendency to
seek out individuals with whom they share the lon-
gest history—their siblings—to engage in life review
(Goetting, 1986). This is a final chance to resolve
rivalries and emotional baggage from childhood
(White, 2001). Older siblings tend to lay to rest un-
resolved childhood rivalries (Goetting, 1986), and
“people’s memories become rosier with time and
distance from childhood conflicts, and thus they let
go of jealousy and competition” (Greif & Woolley,
2016: 70). We therefore expect that the influence of
birth order on risk taking is reduced with age due to
the cognitive and emotional aspects related to the
recall of childhood sibling rivalry.
Consistent with this idea, research has suggested
that while birth order effects persist later in life, the
effects weaken over time (e.g., Suitor & Pillemer,
2007). Indeed, Cicirelli (1982: 278) concluded that
“the weight of evidence frommost sources indicates
a lessening of rivalry with age.” Specifically, based
ona sampleof individuals ranging inage from59–94,
Jefferson et al. (1998) found that the effects of birth
order were weaker than observed in studies with
younger samples. Similarly, in theirmeta-analysis of
risk taking in sports, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft
(2010) found that studies of children had larger ef-
fects than those of adults and adolescents. Further,
Myers and Goodboy (2006) found that the perceived
use of verbally aggressive messages between sib-
lings, a potential indicator of sibling rivalry, de-
creases across the lifespan.
We thus suggest that as CEOs age, theymay be less
likely to recall the sibling rivalry andassociated risky
behaviors utilized in their childhood, and that the
emotional intensity of recalled sibling rivalrywill be
weaker. While we accept the imprinting effects of
birth order reported in prior studies, we suggest that
the potency of these effects diminishes as CEOs age,
such that the relationship is stronger for younger
CEOs and weaker for older CEOs. More formally:
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
CEO age, such that the relationship is strengthened
when CEOs are younger in age and weakened when
CEOs are older in age.
Ongoing Sibling Rivalry
While the tendency to use risky behaviors associ-
ated with birth order develops during childhood, we
theorize that the underlying mechanism of sibling
rivalry may be amplified in situations in adulthood
that facilitate ongoing sibling competition. Scholars
have suggested that birth order effects are dependent
on “whether or not certain attitudes and sentiments
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about the family”—specifically sibling rivalry—“are
tapped in ways that make them salient” (Sulloway,
2007: 162). Indeed, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft
(2010) suggested that birth order differences may
be more context sensitive than previously believed.
Building on this logic, we theorize that the intensity
of an ongoing rivalry with siblings amplifies the re-
lationship between birth order and risk taking.
A factor that may be indicative of an individual’s
ongoing sibling rivalry in adulthood is whether they
have a sibling in the same career and position. Sibling
rivalry can become salient in adulthoodwhen siblings
have the same job because “habits of mutual monitor-
ing and social comparison formed in the course of
competition for parental recognition during the early
childhood period” can “influence adult sibling re-
lationships and rivalry” (Ko & Park, 2017: 3). This is
especially relevant as it relates to siblings having the
same career and position. Scholars have noted that
“achievement is the dimension of rivalry par excel-
lence,” and that adulthoodachievement takes the form
of professional success (Ross &Milgram, 1982: 238). In
terms of having the same career and position, Bexley
(2017: 1) noted, “when you choose to take the same
career path as your sibling, you are almost asking for
comparisons to be made all through your life. There’s
no doubt that [. . .] will make you more competitive.”
Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) similarly suggested
that adult behaviors continue to be sensitive to sibling
rivalry when two siblings are in the same career and
position.
Research across contexts has supported the idea
that sibling rivalry intensifies when siblings have the
samecareer andposition.McNerneyandUsner (2001),
for example, found that sibling rivalry peaked when
siblingswere each focused on similar tasks. Further, in
a study of MLB players, having a sibling who also
played professional baseball amplified sibling rivalry
(Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). Specifically, playing
in a similar athletic position tended to increase com-
petition among siblings (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft,
2010). Justin Upton, a player in MLB whose sibling,
Melvin, is a professional baseball playerwhoplays the
same position, said, “having an older brother to try to
catch up to just added a little more fire under my butt.
That’s what drove me” (Jones, 2007)—we theorize
similar effects for CEOs.
For aCEO, having a siblingwho alsoworks as aCEO
should promote greater sibling rivalry and thus am-
plify birth order’s relationship with risk taking. Re-
search has found rivalry between siblings in the
business context. For example, Levinson (1971: 382)
described the influence of sibling rivalry in firms,
stating that, “the rivalry [. . .] which began in child-
hood, continues into adult life” and “can reach suchan
intensity that it colors everymanagement decision.”A
few studies on family businesses, where having a sib-
ling who is also a CEO is somewhat common,4 have
also corroborated this idea. Research, for example, has
suggested that sibling relationships drive rivalry as
sibling managers compete for power and status in
family firms’ leadership (Kaye, 1991; Sorenson, 1999).
More relevant to our theorizing, Ko and Park (2017: 1)
suggested an “intense rivalry between sibling CEOs,”
that influences CEOs’ strategic actions. In further sup-
port of our theorizing, one of the two aforementioned
sibling CEOs we interviewed noted that he and his
brother were “competitors in most activities that we
bothdid,” and that his brother “was inbig business and
made a lot more money than I. . .so, possibly there was
competition there.”
Given the heightened sibling rivalry experienced
when a CEO has a sibling who is also a CEO, we
theorize that the relationship between CEO birth
order and strategic risk taking will be stronger com-
pared to instances when a CEO does not have a sib-
ling CEO. We thus theorize:
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is moderated by
the presence of a sibling CEO, such that the relation-
ship is strengthened when a CEO has a sibling who
is a CEO and weakened when a CEO does not have
a sibling who is a CEO.
METHODS
Context
We tested our theory in the context of family-
controlled business groups in South Korea known as
Chaebols,5 and specifically the publicly traded firms
4 While having a sibling CEO is common in family firms,
especially business groups, it also occurs in nonfamily
firms. Indeed, we found seven recent instances where
siblings simultaneously served as CEO of large U.S. public
firms (FBCG, 2017). For example, DeniseMorrisonwas the
CEOofCampbell SoupandMaggieWilderrotter (her sister)
was the CEO of Frontier Communications.
5 Chaebols are South Korean business groups that con-
sist of multiple private or publicly traded companies,
typically ownedandmanagedbya familydynasty. In2015,
the largest Chaebols consisted of an average of approxi-
mately 28 affiliated companies. Someprominent examples
of Chaebols are Hyundai, Samsung, and the LG Group.
These Chaebol-affiliated companies have many similari-
ties to U.S. public companies that are family controlled.
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within suchgroups.Therewere threemain reasons for
this choice. First, family firms, and more specifically
business groups, are ubiquitous around the world.
Research has shown that theWestern conception of
organizations (i.e., nonfamily firms with dispersed
shareholders), on which management research has
largely focused, is less common than believed
(Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016; Patel & Cooper,
2014). Family firms comprise the majority of pub-
licly traded firms in the world, even in the United
States, where widely held corporations are thought
to pervade (Feldman et al., 2016; La Porta et al.,
1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2009, 2010). Indeed, re-
search has noted that family firms make up at least
two thirds of all businesses around the world and
generate approximately 70–90%of global GDP (FFI,
2018).
A large portion of family-controlled firms are busi-
nessgroups,orcollectionsof legally independent firms
operating across multiple industries bonded together
by formal (e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Indeed, business groups are a
prevalent organizational form across much of Asia,
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East (Colpan
et al., 2010). In fact, as illustrated by Table 1, business
groups are common in many of the top global econo-
mies in theworld, and in SouthKorea in particular the
top five business groups alone account for 51% of the
country’s market capitalization (Bloomberg, 2018).
Our context thus captures much of South Korea’s
economy—the11th largesteconomyin theworld—and
allows our findings to generalize to a substantial por-
tion of global businesses.
Second, our setting is suitable for our proposed
theory since it allows observation of ongoing sibling
rivalry, a mechanism relevant to our theorizing
(Sulloway, 2001). In family business groups, multi-
ple siblings tend to be involved (Carney, 2008), with
some serving as CEOs of independent firms at the
same time—a condition we argue contributes to on-
going sibling rivalry. Our context is thus well suited
for tests of CEO birth order that not only examine its
impact on strategic decisions, but also elucidate the
underlying sibling rivalry mechanism.
Finally, this context allows us to overcome signifi-
cantdatacollectionchallenges.To test ourhypotheses,
we required detailed family background information,
such as birth order, family size, and age and gender of
each sibling, for a large number of CEOs for whomwe
couldalsocollectmatchingdataonstrategic risk taking
and other control variables. It was infeasible to collect
this data through surveys because of generally low re-
sponse rates by executives (Cycyota & Harrison, 2002)
and the sensitive nature and amount of data we
needed. In South Korea, however, it is possible to ob-
tain detailed personal information about the families
behindbusiness groups because of the level of scrutiny
they are subject to by the public. In particular, media
and research organizations have traced these families’
histories across several decades and made this in-
formationpublicly available throughnewsarticles and
books (Han,Shipilov,&Greve, 2017).At the same time,
however, we were able to largely replicate our results
in a small sample of United States–based CEOs,which
we discuss in our supplementary analyses.
While the use of data on South Korean business
groups enables the advantages mentioned above,
prior studies have recommended that research using
international samples should consider how the
context may influence the theories being tested
(Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). We acknowledge the
need for such consideration, as the ideas we drew
from to develop our theory may be impacted by our
context. Therefore, we next discuss how our context
may influence (1) the effects of birth order and (2) the
effects of CEOs on firm strategy.
Study context and the effects of birth order. A
potential concern is whether birth order–related pre-
dictions can be applied to the SouthKorean context. In
this regard, we note again that our arguments about
CEO birth order are rooted in evolutionary theory.
Notions of niche partitioning (Sulloway, 2001) are
universal, are not thought to be driven by unique cul-
turalnuances, andcanevenbeapplied to thebehaviors
of nonhuman species, such as sharks or birds (Buss,
2007).We thus agreewithDenny’s (2004: 17) view that
as it relates to birth order, “the underlying psycholog-
ical mechanisms [. . .] are not culture specific.” To ex-
amine this assertion further, we sought studies of birth
order differences in the top 15 economies in theworld.
As reported in Table 2, we found studies in each of
these countries that support birth order differences
across a broad range of outcomes. This review suggests
that birth order differences are ubiquitous and not
necessarily bound by cultural or national borders.
Nevertheless, some specific aspects of the South
Korean context are worth highlighting for their po-
tential influence on birth order differences and sib-
ling rivalry. One aspect is the Confucian culture of
deference towardone’s elders (primarily parents, but
also older siblings)within the family (Kim,Atkinson,
& Yang, 1999; Pyke, 2005). This tendency could po-
tentially serve to mitigate overt sibling rivalry and
reduce the likelihood of observing significant CEO
birth order effects basedon sibling rivalry.Counter to
this argument, however, is the fact that in family firm
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settings, there is a tendency for siblings to compete
vigorously with each other, often for the rights to
succession of the company or the broader business
group (Kets de Vries, 1993; Peng & Jiang, 2010).
South Korean media also closely scrutinizes and
dedicates a great deal of attention to business groups
and the sibling rivalry occurringwithin family firms,
so it is also possible that this unique cultural aspect
might further intensify sibling rivalry (Han et al.,
2017). With arguments that would support the case
for both a subdued and amplified sibling rivalry ef-
fect based on contextual nuances, it is difficult to
proclaim a prioriwhether our context makes it more
or less likely to find significant birth order effects.
However, as we point out above, prior research has
suggested that birth order effects are not culturally
specific.
Study context and CEO effects.Another point to
consider is the extent to which CEOs in South Korea
can affect firm outcomes. It has been well established
in the upper echelons literature that managerial dis-
cretion, or the latitude of action given to executives
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), varies across cultural
contexts. Crossland and Hambrick’s (2007, 2011)
framework predicts variance in CEO effects across
countries.For instance,SouthKoreanCEOs’discretion
may be limited as the strong cultural norms of collec-
tivism restrict the individual initiative that CEOs can
exercise (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004),
and a tendency toward uncertainty avoidance also
typically restricts CEOs’ leeway (Schwartz, 1994).
Further, South Korea’s legal system inhibits CEOs’ in-
fluence over stakeholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000), and the relatively low
labor flexibility reduces the latitude of action CEOs
have over their employees (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, &
Soskice, 2001). Bearing out these arguments, industry
experts and academics have rated South Korean CEOs
as having low levels of managerial discretion com-
pared to CEOs in other countries (Crossland &
Hambrick, 2011).
Our choice of empirical context can thus be justified
on the basis of generalizability, observation of theo-
retical mechanisms, and data availability. This setting
also allows for a fairly conservative test of our hy-
potheses givenSouthKoreanCEOs’ limiteddiscretion,
whichmaymake itmore difficult to find a relationship
between a CEO characteristic and strategic outcome.
Sample and Data Sources
For data on birth order and characteristics of CEOs’
families, we relied primarily on The Chaebol of
Korea: The management structure and personal
network of Korean Chaebols (Kim, Kim, Paik, Jeong,
Paik, & Yoo, 2005), which details major business
families in South Korea based on extensive research,
including information on thenames andbirthdates of
the founders, their descendants, and their relatives.
To supplement this source and keep the family trees
up to date, we searched news articles, obituaries, and
other sources as needed.We obtained other firm- and
CEO-level data from databases of the Korea In-
formation Service (KIS), the largest credit rating
agency in the country, and the Korea Listed Compa-
nies Association (KLCA) (e.g., Han et al., 2017; Lee &
Song, 2012; Siegel, 2007). Acquisition data were ob-
tained from SDC platinum.
To construct our dataset, we sampled firms affili-
ated with the largest Chaebols as identified by the
Korea Fair Trade Commission. We then identified
cases in which members of the Chaebol families
served as CEOs of these publicly traded firms during
1999–2015. After accounting for missing data, we
arrived at a sample of 71 CEOs across 67 firms, and a
final sample size of 503 CEO-years. It is noteworthy
that all CEOs in our sample are males, but this is not
surprising given that South Korea ranks low in global
studies of gender equality (e.g., it was recently ranked
116th in the world) (World Economic Forum, 2016).
While we observe no female CEOs in our sample,
unfortunately the underrepresentation of female
CEOs is consistent with many settings across the
world, including the United States (Favaro, Karlsson,
& Neilson, 2014).
Dependent Variable: Strategic Risk Taking
Consistentwithprior research,wemeasuredstrategic
risk taking by aggregating three major outlays typically
associated with uncertain and potentially negative
returns: capital expenditures, research and develop-
ment (R&D) spending, and acquisitions (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Capital
expenditures and R&D spending were obtained from
theKLCAdatabase, and acquisitionsweremeasured as
the transaction value of all completed acquisitions as
reported in SDC platinum. We aggregated these risk-
taking indicators instead of treating them as separate
dependent variables because these spending categories
often substitute for each other. For example, a firmmay
expand its product portfolio through an acquisition in-
stead of through R&D investments. We formed a risk-
taking index by logging the sum of the three different
types of risky spending to create an aggregate indicator
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011).
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Independent Variables
CEO birth order. To obtain our sample of CEOs,
we used the KISLINE database, which lists execu-
tives according to their rank within the company.
TheCEOwas identified as theperson rankednumber
1 within each company (Chang & Shin, 2006). This
treatment of the most senior executive of a business
group–affiliated firm as CEO is consistent with
prior research (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). It is
important to note that the head of the entire business
group (i.e., the group chairman) is typically distinct
from the CEO at the publicly traded firm level.
For example, the current group chairman of the
Samsung Group is Lee Kun-hee, but the CEO of
Samsung Electronics, a publicly traded firm in
the Samsung Group, is Kwon Oh-hyun. Similar to
CEOs in other contexts, our CEOs have broad influ-
ence over the entire firm, so they are also distinct
from division heads, whose influence typically is
more limited within the organization.
TheCEO birth order variablewas coded as the order
in which CEOs were born to their parents. It took the
value of 1 for a first-born, 2 for a second-born, 3 for a
third-born, etc. Following prior studies (e.g., Booth &
Kee, 2009; De Haan, 2010), we treated birth order as a
continuous variable in our regression models predict-
ing strategic risk taking. This approach allows in-
terpretation of the linear effects of increases or
decreases in birth order and avoids the loss of in-
formation caused by forcing birth order to be a cate-
gorical or discrete variable. This approach, however,
hinges on the assumption that there is a generally lin-
ear relationship between birth order and the outcome
(strategic risk taking), and that deviations from linear-
ity in the relationshipbetweenbirthorder and strategic
risk taking are not significant. We therefore conducted
Wald tests to assess this assumption statistically (Pasta,
2009). Two different ways of operationalizing birth
orderwere tested. The firstwas to treat all the observed
birth orders as different discrete categories. In our case
this lead to seven categories given that the birth orders
ofCEOs inour sample ranged fromfirst to seventh.The
secondmethodwas to treatbirthorderascomprisingof
three categories: first-born,middle-born, and last-born.
In both cases, the test of deviation from linearity
entailed entering the continuous birth order variable
simultaneously with the categorical variables in a
generalized estimating equations (GEE) model pre-
dicting strategic risk taking (Long & Freese, 2006). The
numberofdummyvariablesenteredshouldbe twoless
than the number of categories (i.e., five dummies for
the seven-category measure of birth order and one
dummy in the case of the three-category measure).
According to these tests, neither the seven-category
measure nor the three-category measure of birth order
was statistically significant. This led us to conclude
that the continuous treatment of birth order is pre-
ferred, as its deviations from linearity were not statis-
tically significant (Pasta, 2009; Williams, 2016).
Closest sibling age gap.Thisvariablewasmeasured
as the number of years between the focal CEOs and
their closest sibling (e.g., Buckles & Munnich, 2012).
When the focal CEOwas a first-born, the closest sibling
was the immediate younger sibling. In cases where an
individual had a younger and older sibling, we de-
termined the closest sibling based on their birthdates.
Presence of sibling CEO.Wemeasured presence
of sibling CEO as a binary indicator that takes the
value of 1 when a sibling of the focal CEO was si-
multaneously a CEO of another independently
traded firm (this occurred for 37% of our CEO-year
observations). This determination was made based
on the executives list provided in the KIS database.
All of the sibling CEOs in our sample are males.
CEO age.Wecaptured CEO age by subtracting the
focal year from the CEO’s birth year.
Controls
We included several CEO-level control variables in
our models. As birth order studies have noted, it is
critical to control for thenumber of siblings (Belmont&
Marolla, 1973; Booth & Kee, 2009). Family size is in-
evitably correlatedwithbirth order, so it is not possible
to isolate the effects of one without accounting for the
other.We thus controlled for CEOs’number of siblings
(logarithm was taken) in our regression models. Be-
cause the extent of sibling rivalry may depend on the
gender composition of the siblings one grew up with,
we controlled for CEOs’ number of female siblings
(logarithm was taken). CEO ownership,6 measured as
the proportion of total outstanding shares held by a
CEO, was included as it may be related to a CEOs’
decision-making power within a firm, as well as the
6 While, ideally, we would have also controlled for CEO
compensationmore broadly, these data are not available in
our empirical context. Compensation data for individual
executives in South Korea were undisclosed traditionally,
and were made partially available in 2013 (due to changes
in regulation). Even these newly disclosed data, however,
were incomplete and unsuitable for our analyses, since
compensation disclosure is required only for executives
paid in excess of 500 million won (approximately 500,000
U.S. dollars) (Kim, Lee, & Shin, 2017).
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incentive to engage in risk taking. We accounted for
economic conditions during CEOs’ upbringing, as it
may influence their level ofnarcissismand in turn their
risk tendencies (e.g., Bianchi, 2014). In contrast to the
mostly stagnant economy prior to the 1960s, South
Korea experienced an extremely rapid “rags-to-riches”
transformation of the economy from the 1960s until
the 1980s that has been called the “Korean Miracle”
(Kim, 1995). Therefore, we included a dummy vari-
able that indicates whether the CEO was born during
an economic upswing (i.e., 1960s-1970s).7 To account
for potential sibling competition within the same
firm, presence of sibling executive was controlled for
as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if there is at
least one executive in the firm who is a sibling of
the CEO.
Several firm-level controlswere also included in our
empirical models. We included firm size, measured as
logged total assets. We also controlled for two different
formsof firmperformance: returnonassets (net income
over total assets) and Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market to
book value). To account for governance mechanisms
known to influence firm risk taking (Lim & McCann,
2014), we accounted for board size (logged number of
board members) and proportion of outside board
members (number of outsidemembers divided by total
number of board members). We also controlled for
presence of female director (binary indicator that takes
thevalueof 1 if at least onewomansits on the board), as
it has a known influence on strategic risk taking (e.g.,
Post & Byron, 2015). Because of their relatedness to
firm-level risk, we also included financial leverage
(measured as a ratio of total liabilities to total sales) and
stockmarketb (e.g., Bromiley,Rau,&Zhang, 2017).All
models also included year fixed effects and industry
fixed effects (industry classification is based on two-
digit industry codes) to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity across different time periods and business
domains.
Estimation Techniques
As we noted, we sampled family CEOs of public
firms associated with Chaebols. This choice may
have introduced a potential sample selection bias,
because even within Chaebol-affiliated firms there
are many instances in which nonfamily pro-
fessionals serve as CEOs. Although a random sample
that included both family and nonfamily (pro-
fessional) CEOs would have been ideal, this was in-
feasible because comprehensive family background
data (e.g., birth order, number of siblings) were not
available for nonfamily CEOs. We therefore adopted
a Heckman two-stage model to account for potential
bias due to our nonrandom CEO sampling.
Our first-stage probit model (i.e., selection model)
predicted the presence of a family CEO in our full
collection of 1,170 CEO-year observations, which
includes family and nonfamily CEOs of our Chaebol-
affiliated firm sample. One challenge in properly
specifying our first-stage model was identifying ex-
clusion restrictions that are correlated with the
likelihood of presence of a family CEO but not with
strategic risk taking (Heckman, 1979). We included
two exclusion restrictions.
Our first exclusion restriction is the business
group chairman’s number of children. This exclu-
sion restriction is suitable for our purposes because it
should be related to the selection bias we are seeking
to correct (i.e., the selection of only family CEOs), as
more children means that there should theoretically
be a higher likelihood of a family CEO, while it
should be uncorrelated with our outcome variable
(i.e., strategic risk taking). Consistent with these ex-
pectations, we find in our data that the business
group chairman’s number of children is not signifi-
cantly correlated with firm-level strategic risk taking
(r 5 2.03; p 5 –.31).
Following Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,
and Wolfenzon (2007), we also used the gender of
the Chaebol chairman’s first child (binary variable
coded as 1 for sons) as an exclusion restriction.
Prior research has suggested that there may be a
relationship between the gender of top executives
and strategic risk taking, although the effects are
typically small (Jeong & Harrison, 2017). In this
study, however, we are measuring the gender of
the group chairman’s first child.While chairmen’s
first children (especially those who are males)
have a higher likelihood of reaching the upper
echelons based on norms of primogeniture, this is
not always the case. As such, we do not expect this
variable to be associatedwith a firm’s strategic risk
taking, making it a suitable exclusion restriction.
Consistent with this logic, our data indicate that
there is a nonsignificant correlation between the
first child of the business group chairman being a
son and firm-level strategic risk taking (r 5 2.05;
p 5 .16).
7 In addition to these controls, we examined the impact of
step siblings fromanothermarriage.We identified threeCEOs
inoursample thatgrewupwithhalf siblingsdue to their father
having more than one spouse. Our findings are unchanged
regardless ofwhetherwe include adummyvariable to control
for these CEOs or drop these CEOs from our analyses.
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This first-stage model also included firm perfor-
mance, firm size, firm age, industry dummies, and year
dummiesaspredictors, androbust standarderrorswere
used. As expected, the business group chairman’s
number of children had a positive and significant in-
fluenceon thepresenceofa familyCEO(p, .01), asdid
whether thebusiness groupchairman’s first childwasa
son (p, .01). The coefficient for firmperformance (p,
.01) was also positive and significant. Since the busi-
ness group chairman’s number of children and gender
of first child each predict the presence of family CEO,
and are not significantly correlated with our depen-
dent variable (i.e., strategic risk taking), the exclusion
restriction criteria are satisfied (e.g., Feldman, Gilson,
& Villalonga, 2013). The inverseMills ratio generated
from the predicted values of this model was included
in the second-stage GEE models, which we discuss
below.
In our second-stage models, we tested our hy-
potheses using GEEs given the nonindependent na-
ture of the observations in our panel data. This
technique is well suited for our purposes because it
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across firms
and CEOs, as well as autocorrelation due to repeated
measurements of these subjects over time (Liang &
Zeger, 1986). Unlike random effects models, which
require that unobserved heterogeneity across firms
and CEOs is uncorrelated with the predictor vari-
ables, GEE does not rely on these strong assumptions
(Liang & Zeger, 1986). Fixed effects models were in-
feasible because they do not estimate parameters for
time-invariant variables, which in our case included
our key independent variable, CEO birth order.
Given these differences, GEE is often used in longi-
tudinal research on time invariant CEO characteris-
tics (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Petrenko,
Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016). We specified an identity
link function, Gaussian family, and first-order auto-
regressive correlation structure for all of our GEE
models. Furthermore,weused robust standarderrors
to account for potential misspecification of the cor-
relation structure and heteroskedasticity (Hardin &
Hilbe, 2003).
To mitigate concerns of reverse causality, we lag-
ged all predictor variables by one year. We also
mean-centered the continuous variables included in
the interaction terms (i.e., CEO age and closest sib-
ling age gap) to mitigate multicollinearity problems.
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the
key variables are reported inTable 3. CEObirth order
is significantly correlated with number of siblings
(r5 .37), which is expected since a later birth order is
possible only to the extent that family size increases.
Research has shown that because these two variables
inevitably share variance, it is important to account
for both at the same time to understand the in-
dependent effects of each (Behrman & Taubman,
1986; Belmont & Marolla, 1973). The number of
siblings variable is logged, so it is worth noting that
CEOs in our sample, on average, have about five
siblings. This average family size is much higher
than what has typically been observed in recent
years. It is not surprising, however, given that the
CEOs in our sample were typically born in the
1940s–1950s in South Korea; this large family size is
in line with what is expected based on global and
local trends during that period (Kwon, Lee, Chang, &
Yu, 1975; World Bank, 2017a). Further, all of the
sampled CEOs had at least one sibling, and we were
thus able to analyze relative birth order without
having to account for only-child effects.
To investigate potential multicollinearity affect-
ing our results, we calculated a variance inflation
factor (VIF) for each model. Average VIFs were less
than 3.2 in all models, and the maximum value for
any variable was 6.6, which is well below the typi-
cal threshold of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2013). The zero-order correlation between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking is insignificant.
However, there are correlates of both the in-
dependent and dependent variable that should be
controlled for to fully understand the relationship;
therefore, looking at bivariate correlations may not
provide great insight into birth order’s impact on
risk taking. Indeed, this is consistent with prior
birth order research, as well as prior CEO charac-
teristics research, that have found small or non-
significant bivariate correlations, but significant,
practical effects in multivariate models (e.g., Black,
Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Chen, Crossland, &
Huang, 2016; Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, &
Johnson, 2015). We now turn to the results of the
GEE models.
Table 4 reports the GEE models predicting strate-
gic risk taking with our predictors. In Hypothesis 1,
we predicted that CEO birth order would positively
influence risk taking. According to Model 1 of
Table 4, CEO birth order has a positive and statisti-
cally significant influence on strategic risk taking
(b5 .17; p, .05), and this holds across Models 2–4,
which include our interaction terms, and Model 5,
which includes all interaction terms. Because
our outcome variable (strategic risk taking) is
1292 AugustAcademy of Management Journal
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TABLE 4
GEE Models Predicting Strategic Risk Taking (t 1 1)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 4.46** 4.56** 4.79** 4.48** 4.88**
(0.99) (1.05) (0.99) (0.96) (1.00)
Closest sibling age gapa 20.11* 0.25† 20.12* 20.11* 0.18
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13)
Sibling executive presence 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.38†
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Sibling CEO 0.01 20.05 0.01 20.55* 20.47†
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.26)
Number of siblings 21.00** 21.06** 21.05** 20.94** 21.05**
(0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31)
Number of female siblings 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.36
(0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40)
CEO stock ownership 0.58† 0.56 0.61* 0.45 0.49
(0.31) (0.36) (0.30) (0.35) (0.38)
CEO agea 20.00 0.00 0.01 20.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Born during economic upswing 20.93** 20.84** 21.04** 20.82** 20.87**
(0.26) (0.25) (0.30) (0.23) (0.26)
Firm size 0.94** 0.92** 0.93** 0.97** 0.95**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Tobin’s Q 0.20* 0.23* 0.20* 0.28** 0.28**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Return on assets 0.26 0.81 20.01 20.12 0.14
(1.74) (1.74) (1.77) (1.69) (1.75)
Presence of female director 0.23 0.41 0.12 0.15 0.21
(0.33) (0.41) (0.32) (0.29) (0.35)
Board size 0.68* 0.64** 0.69** 0.65** 0.62**
(0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.22)
Outside director proportion 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.36 0.47
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40) (0.41)
Stock market b 20.04 20.06 20.03 20.04 20.05
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Financial leverage 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.27 0.88 0.10 0.09 0.47
(0.52) (0.62) (0.51) (0.50) (0.57)
CEO birth order 0.17* 0.20** 0.17** 0.08† 0.12**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
CEO birth order 3 Closest sibling age gapa 20.09* 20.07*
(0.03) (0.03)
CEO birth order 3 CEO agea 20.01 20.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CEO birth order 3 Sibling CEO 0.19* 0.15*
(0.08) (0.07)
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 503 503 503 503 503
Wald x2 82998.2** 43627.4** 151859.9** 24984.1** 27106.3**
a Mean-centered prior to inclusion in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p , 0.1
*p , 0.05
**p , 0.01
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log-transformed, the magnitude of effects can be best
understood by exponentiating the regression coeffi-
cients to obtain values that can be used to infer the
percentage change in theoutcome.Wecan infer that for
each increase in birth order, risky spending increases
by 19%. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported by our data.
Hypothesis 2 theorized that closest sibling age gap
wouldnegativelymoderate the relationship between
CEO birth order and strategic risk taking. The results
of this test are reported in Model 2 of Table 4, which
indicates that themoderating effect of closest sibling
age gap is negative and significant (b 5 20.09; p ,
0.05). This result also holds inModel 5, where all the
interaction terms are included. A graph of this
moderating effect, shown in Figure 1, allows further
investigation of this finding. Note that the Y-axis,
strategic risk taking, is depicted on a logarithmic
scale, and needs to be exponentiated for proper in-
ference of magnitude of effects. Specifically, a one-
unit increase in CEO birth order is associated with a
33% increase in strategic risk taking when the age
gap is small (one standard deviation below the
mean), whereas the increase is 9%when the age gap
is large (one standard deviation above the mean).
Hypothesis 2 is thus statistically supported.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effects of
CEO birth order on risk taking would be negatively
moderated by CEO age. To test that idea, we entered
the relevant interaction term in Model 3 of Table 4.
The results of this model show that CEO age is not a
statistically significant moderator (b 5 2.01; n.s.),
and this nonsignificance is repeated in Model 5. As
such, our data do not statistically support Hypoth-
esis 3.
We predicted in Hypothesis 4 that the CEO birth
order effect would bemoderated by the presence of
a sibling CEO. Model 4 of Table 4, which reports
the findings of this, shows that the presence of a
sibling CEO is indeed a positive and significant
moderator (b 5 .19; p , .05). This significant
finding holds in Model 5 as well. A graph of this
moderating effect, shown in Figure 2, confirms this
pattern (again, note that strategic risk taking is
depicted on a logarithmic scale). We find that a
one-unit increase in CEO birth order is associated
with a 33% increase in strategic risk taking when
there is a sibling who is a CEO in another firm,
whereas there is a 15% increase when there is no
such sibling who is a CEO. Our findings thus sup-
port Hypothesis 4.
FIGURE 1
Moderating Effect of Sibling Age Gap
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CEO birth order  
Small age gap (mean –1 SD) Large age gap (mean +1 SD)
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SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
As our sample for this study was composed of 503
CEO-year observations in family business groups in
South Korea, there is a possibility that our findings
might be a false positive or attributable to aspects of
our context. With this in mind, we conducted a
number of supplemental analyses to enhance the
generalizability of our theory and findings.
Ruling Out False Positive Results
As adequately powering a study is crucial for
maximizing the value of the findings for reasons
related to both Type I and Type II errors (Button
et al., 2013; Ledgerwood, Soderberg, & Sparks,
2017), we wanted to ensure that the sample in our
primary analyseswas adequatelypowered. Todo so,
we used the G*Power program to calculate the
power of our statistical tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). To be conservative, we assumed a
small effect size (f-squared 5 .02 using the widely
cited Cohen criteria), we set our a to .05 and power
was set at 80%, and we input that we had 45 pre-
dictors in the model. According to the power anal-
ysis via G*Power, we need a total sample size of 395
to achieve 80%power. Given that our sample is 503,
this suggests that our statistical power is well in
excess of 80%, helping to alleviate concerns related
to power driving false positives. In addition to
this program suggesting that our study is ade-
quately powered, scholars have noted that, when
considering power in longitudinal data, there are
a number of rules of thumb, including six to 10 ob-
servations per predictor (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim,
& Wasserman, 1996) and 10 observations per pre-
dictor (Howell, 1992). Given that our sample is in
excess of 500 observations and we have 45 pre-
dictors, we once againmeet the generally accepted
criteria.
In addition to power being a concern as it relates
to false positives, there is a possibility that the
sample drawn is an outlier among the sampling
distribution. One means by which to reduce this
possibility is to make certain the results within a
given sample are not driven by outliers. To assess
this possibility, we winsorized our dependent var-
iable at the 1%and 99% levels, and our results were
substantively unchanged. Finally, regarding con-
cerns about our findings being driven by false pos-
itives, we are using robust standard errors for amore
conservative test of our hypotheses.
FIGURE 2
Moderating Effect of Sibling CEO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CEO birth order  
Sibling CEO = 0 Sibling CEO = 1
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U.S. Sample of CEOs
To establish the generalizability of our sample
outside of CEOs of Korean business groups, we con-
ducted a supplemental analysis examining a sample
of U.S. public firm CEOs. Specifically, we examined
data available in Ancestry.com and discovered that
this website’s most detailed records end with the
1940 U.S. census. Based on this constraint, we began
gathering data for individuals who were: (1) a CEO in
Execucomp in 1992, which is the first year it existed
(this increased the odds these CEOs would appear in
the 1940 census) and, (2) born before 1940 (so they
would be included in the 1940 census).
With these constraints in place, we performed In-
ternet searches on this subsample of CEOs from
Execucomp in 1992. The goal of these searches was
to gather enough information so that we could be
certain the census record in Ancestry.com was the
proper record for each CEO. To do so, we needed to
find each CEO’s (1) birthdate, (2) hometown at birth,
and (3) parents’names.Whenwewere able to collect
of this information for a givenCEO,we entered it into
Ancestry.com. Even in those cases where we had all
of this information, however, there was still often
uncertainty about whether we definitely had the
correct record—such as when the one parent’s name
was close to, but did not exactly match, the namewe
found from other sources. If there was any un-
certainty about the match, that CEO was excluded
from our analyses. After performing these multiple
searches, we generated a sample of 36 CEOs for
whom we could gather their birth order as well as
their sibling information from the 1940 U.S. census
or from the 1930 U.S. census (for older CEOs). We
were also able to gather most of the same controls,
except for some of our board controls, for which data
were not available.
Using the same estimation technique as for our
main analyses, we were able to replicate our main
effect of birth order on CEO risk taking (p , .05)
found in our Korean sample. We were also able to
replicate our moderating effect of closest-sibling age
gap (p , .05), and the moderating effect of age was
nonsignificant, as in ourmain analyses.Wewere not
able to gather data on whether siblings were simul-
taneously employed as CEOs, due lack of data
availability in regards to this variable. Thus, the
results of the three hypotheses we retested in our
U.S.-based sample are substantively similar to our
Korea-based test in terms of direction and statistical
significance, which helps to provide additional
support for the generalizability of our theory.
Other Analyses
While we tested Hypothesis 2 using a linear mea-
sure of age gap with closest sibling, we further
examined whether the results hold when using a
discretemeasure of age gap. Based on prior literature
that has suggested sibling rivalry is intensified when
the gap with siblings is less than five years (e.g.,
Sulloway, 1996), we created a dichotomous variable
coded as 1 when that condition is met. We find sta-
tistically significant support for ourHypothesis 2 in a
model predicting strategic risk taking, when inter-
acting CEO birth order with the small age gap with
closet sibling (less than five years) variable (b 5 .27;
p , .05). The results also hold when using a moder-
ator variable that captures age gap with closest sib-
ling that is less than three years (e.g., Baer, Oldham,
Hollingshead, & Costa Jacobsohn, 2005).
Prior research has noted that any credible study on
birth order effects should control for number of sib-
lings, as we do in our study, since large sibships are
biased for later-borns (Ernst & Angst, 1983). In a
meta-analysis, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010)
found that studies controlling for number of sib-
lings produced larger effect sizes than did studies
lacking this control. That is, number of siblings acts
as a suppressor variable: “a variable which increases
the predictive validity of another variable (or set of
variables) by its inclusion in a regression equation”
(Tzelgov&Henik, 1991). Consistentwith this notion,
we found that in both our South Korean and
U.S. sample, the effect of CEObirth order on strategic
risk taking was not statistically significant when
number of siblings was dropped, and became sig-
nificant when it was included in the regression
models. This underscores the importance of ac-
counting for key confounds and potential suppres-
sors, such as number of siblings, to understand the
true effects of birth order.
DISCUSSION
Birth order, which captures early-life family do-
main experiences, is a fundamental determinant of
individual behavior (Damian & Roberts, 2015;
Jaskiewicz et al., 2017) and has captured the atten-
tion of the general public and researchers alike.
Within the upper echelons literature, and the
broader management literature, however, “this truth
has not had much impact” (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017:
309). We thus attempt to shift the theoretical con-
versation surroundingCEOexperiences to the family
domain—adomain that scholars have suggestedmay
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have a great impact, even on top executives (Smith,
2009). Drawing on evolutionary theory arguments
related to sibling rivalry, we develop theory sug-
gesting that CEO birth order is positively associated
with strategic risk taking. To provide further evi-
dence for our proposed sibling rivalry mechanism,
we propose three moderators to assess sibling ri-
valry. The results of our primary analyses using a
South Korea-based sample, a supplementary analy-
sis of a U.S.-based sample, and other robustness
checks largely support our theorizing.
Implications
Our theorizing and results have a number of im-
plications. First, we contribute to the upper echelons
literature by shifting the conversation around exec-
utives’ experiences to the family domain, specifi-
cally birth order. Studies within this paradigm have
primarily examined how work-related experiences
shapeCEOs’decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This
primary focus on work-related experiences suggests
that researchers have little understanding of the im-
pact of family domain experiences onCEOs,which is
problematic given that the family is arguably the
“most important and enduring of all human social
groupings” (Smith, 2009: 5). Through the construct
of birth order, we are able to shift the theoretical
conversation to a construct that captures some of the
most personal and earliest possible types of experi-
ences. This construct may be of great importance to
our understanding of CEO characteristics, as birth
order is one of themost fundamental life experiences
and is an engrained determinant of behaviors
(Damian & Roberts, 2015; Plomin & Daniels, 1987),
regardless of cultural context (Denny, 2004).
As illustrated through our theorizing and results,
birth order in our sample does appear to influence
CEOs’ behavior. In line with evolutionary theory
arguments suggesting that the later an individual is
born in the sibling hierarchy, the more they will en-
gage in risk taking to gain parental favor (Grable &
Joo, 2004; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010), we find
that risk-taking tendencies established in childhood
continue into the executive suite. In our sample, we
found that CEO birth order was positively related to
strategic risk taking. Specifically, we found that for
each one-unit increase in birth order, CEOs took 19%
more risk in our sample. Given the pervasive nature
of birth order, future research might also investi-
gate other strategic decisions that CEO birth order
influences. Further, given that this research im-
plies that a characteristic that we classify with
experiences, birth order, potentially influences a
psychological property, risk-taking propensity, we
suggest, consistentwith Finkelstein et al. (2009), that
future research might more directly address this
mutual causality, and examine the association be-
tween the two categories of characteristics.
Second, our study responds to recent calls to le-
verage “family science” theories to advance manage-
ment research (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017) given the
important impact family experiences have on in-
dividuals (Smith, 2009: 5). Despite the fact that in the
upper echelons of organizations the demands ofwork
and family domains certainly interact, very little is
understood. In response, we drew on evolutionary
theory arguments to illustrate the firm-level implica-
tions of birth order and sibling rivalry on CEO risk
taking. Our findings suggest that the family environ-
ment in which a CEO grew up influences their stra-
tegic decisions. Our findings also suggest that when
the family life is present in the workplace there are
implications. Indeed, we found that having a sibling
CEO amplifies strategic risk taken by the CEO. Future
research may investigate additional implications of
CEOs having sibling CEOs, especially given that in
family business groups, multiple siblings tend to be
involved (Carney, 2008). Future research might in-
vestigate the impact of other nonwork experiences,
such as other experiences in the family domain or
even activities that CEOs might do for leisure.
Third,we contribute to themultidisciplinary birth
order literature by developing new theory regarding
moderators of birth order. While scholars have sug-
gested that birth order effects are contingent on
moderating factors (e.g., Sulloway, 1999), little is
understood in this regard. We address this oversight
by building on evolutionary theory arguments sug-
gesting that birth order effects are driven by sibling
rivalry, and theorizing that the extent to which sib-
ling rivalrywas present during childhood, the extent
to which childhood sibling rivalry is recalled, and
the extent to which sibling rivalry is ongoing will
moderate the CEO birth order–strategic risk taking
relationship. Our results provide support for these
ideas as the closest sibling age gap and the presence
of a sibling CEO each moderate the proposed direct
relationship. Further, even our unsupported hy-
pothesis regarding the moderating effect of age con-
tributes to the understanding of birth order effects.
The fact that birth order effects are not diluted over
time is itself notable. That is, whether the CEO is 35
or 93 years old (the range of CEO ages in our Korean
sample), we found no evidence that birth order ef-
fects diminished over time.
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Finally, we contribute to the literature by advanc-
ing understanding surrounding an important firm
outcome—strategic risk taking. As risk taking is a core
decision CEOs undertake and is the focus of many
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., Eisenhardt,
1989; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), better un-
derstanding CEOs’ risk preferences has implications
for scholars and practitioners. Indeed, while scholars
have focused on how a number of factors shape risk-
taking behaviors, including the way in which a de-
cision is framed, societal factors (e.g., Hofstede, 2001),
and confidence (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007),
our paper shifts the focus of this literature toward a
different factor entirely—birth order. Indeed, birth
order may be considered an observable ex ante in-
dicator of CEOs’ attitude toward risk, and thus may
influence how they frame risk taking.
Limitations and Future Research
This study is not without limitations. First, like
many studies on CEOs, we were concerned with
endogeneity, especially sample-selection bias (i.e.,
sample-induced endogeneity) given that we sampled
family CEOs associated with Chaebols due to data
availability.While these issues can never be ruled out
completely, we took a number of steps to mitigate
these concerns. First,we testedourhypothesesusing a
Heckman two-stage model: in the first stage we esti-
mated a model that predicts the likelihood of family
CEO presence with a set of predictors that includes
exclusion restrictions, and those results were used to
calculateaninverseMills ratio included in thesecond-
stage GEE (AR1) models. Our data are also uniquely
suited to deal with endogeneity concerns, given that
the key predictors in both stages of the estimation—
i.e., genderof first-bornchild in the first stage andbirth
order in the second stage—were clearly determined
exogenously, at the time of individuals’ birth. Thus,
our approachalloweda stringent andconservative test
of our proposed hypotheses.
Second, while evolutionary theory suggests that
sibling rivalry drives birth order effects, like most
archival research on CEOs we were not able to di-
rectly test the sibling rivalry mechanism. That said,
in testing our theoretical arguments for our modera-
tors wewere able to empirically examine factors that
may be indicative of past and present sibling rivalry,
specifically age spacing and the presence of a sibling
CEO, as well as the extent to which CEOs may recall
childhood sibling rivalry based on age. Scholars
have suggested that moderators can help provide
further evidence for a theorizedmechanism (Baron&
Kenny, 1986; Shi et al., 2017); thus, while we were
not able to directly test our mechanism, these mod-
erators provide additional evidence for our proposed
sibling rivalry mechanism.
Third, we used CEOs of business groups, or
Chaebols, in South Korea to test our theory. Scholars
have made calls to conduct empirical research in
international contexts, including in those that have
different sociocultural contexts from Western coun-
tries. As such, our context may be considered a
strength of our study given that family firms com-
prise the majority of publicly traded firms in the
world (LaPorta et al., 1999), even in theUnitedStates
where widely held corporations are thought to per-
vade (Feldman et al., 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2009,
2010), and that business groups make up a large
percentage of family firms (Masulis, Pham, & Zein,
2011). It is possible, however, that the South Korean
context influenced the relationship between CEO
birth order and strategic risk taking, and thus this
relationship could be different in other countries or
in other business forms. The fact thatwewere largely
able to replicate our results in a U.S.-based sample of
public firms, however, helps alleviate these con-
cerns. These data, however, have some limitations,
including that they comprise a relatively small
sample and that there are truncation issues as it is
possible that the families in our sample continued to
have more children after 1940. While this would not
change any of our CEOs’ birth rank, it doesmean that
two of our control variables—number of siblings and
number of female siblings—may not be entirely ac-
curate. Future research may thus explore the impact
of executive birth order in other countries to help
understand its generalizability. Using Ancestry.com
coupled with census data, future research may be
able to build a more expansive dataset of CEOs with
which to examine the effects of CEO birth order.
Alternatively, scholars may find success gathering
birth order data in other countries where family
business groups are common and are closely scruti-
nized, such as those countries listed in Table 1.
Fourth, a limitation of our study is that that all the
CEOs in our primary and supplementary analyses
were males. As we noted, this is not surprising given
that South Korea ranks low in global studies of gen-
der equality (World Economic Forum, 2016), and
that, unfortunately, the underrepresentation of fe-
male CEOs is consistent with many settings across
the world, including the United States (Favaro et al.,
2014). That said, scholars have found that CEO gen-
der may alter important relationships in the upper
echelons (e.g., Jeong & Harrison, forthcoming); thus,
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future research might examine how birth order im-
pacts male versus female CEOs in samples where
there are enough female CEOs to have adequate
power. Given that many scholars have examined
birth order in samples that included both male and
females, we expect scholars to find that birth order
effects persist for female CEOs, albeit with poten-
tially weaker effects suggested by prior work (e.g.,
Argys et al., 2006; Gilliam & Chatterjee, 2011)
Finally, we did our best to control for as many rele-
vant factors as possible; however, we were not able to
control for some factors that might serve as potential
confounds. For example, we were not able to examine
other TMT members’ birth order given that these in-
dividuals were typically not family members and thus
their birth order and sibling data were not publicly
available. We also were not able to control for poten-
tially importantpersonality factorsofCEOs, suchas the
BigFive, given thenotedreluctanceofCEOs“to submit
to batteries of psychological tests” (Finkelstein et al.,
2009: 50; see also Cycyota & Harrison, 2006; Nadkarni
& Chen, 2014). That said, our supplementary analysis
of U.S. CEOs helps to combat a potential omitted var-
iable problem. Still, future research might examine
whether these findingsholdwhile controlling for some
of these aforementioned factors.
CONCLUSION
The order in which we are born shapes us in pro-
foundways, andwe find that CEOs are no exception.
The later the order of birth, the more strategic risk
CEOs undertake, and this tendency is more pro-
nounced when the conditions for sibling rivalry (a
key mechanism explaining birth order effects) are
salient due to small age gaps with their siblings and
the presence of a sibling CEO. Contrary to our theo-
rizing, the impact of CEO birth order on strategic risk
taking does not diminish as CEOs age. This un-
expected finding reinforces the idea that birth order
effects have a strong lasting effect on individuals,
including CEOs. We believe this study helps ad-
vance management research, the broader multidis-
ciplinary “family science” literature, and the much
needed cross-pollination of ideas between the two.
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